Agentic App Intake Gate
What this adds. SecurityRecipes now has an enterprise intake gate for new agentic apps. It turns “can this AI launch?” into generated evidence instead of a meeting full of vague claims about prompts. Rechecked against MCP 2026-07-28 on August 21, 2026.
Product bet
SecurityRecipes is positioned as the Secure Context Layer for Agentic AI. The next enterprise buying motion is not only “give my agent safe context.” It is “tell me whether this agentic app should exist, what it can reach, and what proof is missing before production.”
The Agentic App Intake Gate is the launch-review primitive for that motion. It scores applications by:
- autonomy level and coordinator behavior;
- private, regulated, secret, or signer data exposure;
- MCP read, write, approval-required, and remote tool authority;
- indirect prompt injection exposure from web, tickets, logs, scanners, documents, advisories, and user content;
- persistent memory and A2A or remote-agent handoffs;
- guardrail evals, telemetry, run receipts, egress boundaries, authorization conformance, skill governance, and incident response;
- human approval and two-key review evidence for high-impact actions.
The result is a simple launch decision that AI platform, product security, GRC, procurement, and trust review reviewers can understand.
Workflow at a glance
Agentic App Intake Gate workflow
Assess a new agentic application across autonomy, data, tools, memory, handoffs, controls, and production evidence before launch.
Signal
Register the application
Capture owners, use case, deployment, models, autonomy, users, data, tools, MCP servers, memory, and handoffs.
Scope
Map the risk surface
Classify sensitive data, high-impact actions, private network access, injection sources, persistence, and delegated authority.
Decision
Verify launch controls
Check guardrail evals, authorization, egress, telemetry, receipts, incident response, approvals, and two-key review.
Action
Set launch constraints
Approve reference use, authorize a guarded pilot, hold for review, deny, or kill a dangerous launch request.
Proof
Issue the intake record
Document allowed environments, tools, context, controls, owners, expiry, gaps, and reassessment triggers.
Decision gate
Does the application have controls and evidence proportionate to its autonomy, data, and action impact?
Launch only in the approved environment and operating profile.
Hold or deny until controls exist; kill requests containing signer, token-passthrough, or approval-bypass signals.
Evidence to retain
- application inventory and threat surface
- control/eval evidence
- launch decision and constraints
Expected outputs
- intake decision
- guarded pilot plan
- control-gap register
Generated artifact
- Source profile:
data/assurance/agentic-app-intake-profile.json - Generator:
scripts/generate_agentic_app_intake_pack.py - Runtime evaluator:
scripts/evaluate_agentic_app_intake_decision.py - Evidence pack:
data/evidence/agentic-app-intake-pack.json - MCP tools:
recipes_agentic_app_intake_pack, paired withrecipes_playbook_planusing playbook idagentic-app-intake-gate.
Regenerate and validate:
python3 scripts/generate_agentic_app_intake_pack.py
python3 scripts/generate_agentic_app_intake_pack.py --check
Evaluate a guarded remediation agent host:
python3 scripts/evaluate_agentic_app_intake_decision.py \
--app-id repository-remediation-agent-host \
--deployment-environment enterprise_pilot \
--egress-decision allow_internal_boundary \
--authorization-decision allow_authorized_mcp_request \
--telemetry-decision telemetry_ready \
--human-approval-id approval-ci \
--approver product-security \
--approver service-owner \
--two-key-review \
--expect-decision approve_guarded_pilot
Block high-impact signer or production authority:
Decision model
| Decision | Meaning |
|---|---|
approve_reference_launch |
Read-only or open-reference agentic app can launch with normal evidence refresh. |
approve_guarded_pilot |
App can run only as a guarded pilot with approval, telemetry, egress, and run receipts. |
hold_for_agentic_app_security_review |
Architecture or security review is required before launch or expansion. |
deny_until_controls_exist |
High-risk app lacks required controls or must be redesigned before launch. |
kill_session_on_launch_signal |
Runtime launch request includes a hard-stop signal such as signer access, token passthrough, private-network egress, approval bypass, or autonomous high-impact action. |
Why this is trust review-relevant
This page gives the project an obvious enterprise product surface:
- hosted private app inventory;
- launch review APIs for AI platform teams;
- MCP gateway evidence ingestion;
- app-level posture diffs when tools, skills, prompts, memory, or Agent Cards change;
- procurement exports that show why an app is reference-safe, pilot-ready, review-only, or blocked;
- production policy packs a model provider or security vendor can embed into agent platforms.
That is the credible open-core path: open launch-review knowledge first, then production MCP-backed intake, posture, policy, and trust-center APIs.
Industry alignment
The gate is aligned with current 2026 agentic security direction:
- OWASP treats autonomous planning, tool misuse, identity abuse, memory/context poisoning, insecure inter-agent communication, cascading failures, and rogue-agent containment as first-class agentic risks.
- OWASP Agentic Skills guidance makes behavior packages part of the execution supply chain.
- MCP authorization now emphasizes protected-resource metadata, resource indicators, audience-bound tokens, PKCE, and token-passthrough prevention.
- OpenAI’s Agents SDK guardrail model separates input, output, and tool guardrails, with tool guardrails needed around function-tool calls.
- Anthropic’s Claude Code security guidance emphasizes read-only defaults, explicit approval, trust verification, sandboxing, and MCP server trust.
- CISA and NIST guidance keep the enterprise focus on data provenance, integrity, access control, monitoring, incident evidence, secure defaults, and governed AI risk management.